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The subject of hub ports has become an increasingly
important one in Latin America owing to the rapid growth of
international goods flows that has resulted from trade
liberalization and economic globalization. The aim of this
paper is to reappraise hub ports in Mexico from a viewpoint
that situates the unit of analysis in the global sphere, as the
technological, organizational and geographical changes being
undergone by ports and liner shipping worldwide largely
determine the limitations and opportunities for port
development in the country. In this initial approach to the
subject, five criteria of analysis are established for
ascertaining the opportunities and potential of Mexican ports
operating liner sea container services within the new
international maritime and port context. The paper ends by
setting forth some general prospects and conclusions for
consideration by actors, both public and private, concerned
with port development.
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I
Introduction
Hub ports have become the new development paradigm
for Latin American sea transport and trade. It is a weak
paradigm, undoubtedly, with little to sustain it, as it is
based primarily on adaptation of the working methods,
organization and technology of the central countries,
but lacks the kind of conceptual basis that can draw on
disciplines such as geography and transport economics
to attain an understanding of the conditions, limitations
and development opportunities of port complexes of
this type in peripheral countries.1
In general terms, hub ports are characterized by
the ability to attract cargo whose places of origin or
destination (be they in the same country as the port or
elsewhere) lie well outside their traditional hinterland
or zone of influence. Cargo is concentrated in such ports
in two main ways: by sea, when cargo bound for other
ports is trans-shipped, and by land, as the port’s
hinterland grows to take in vast territories, perhaps
extending beyond the country’s borders.
There is virtually no country in Latin America that
does not have some plan for a hub port on its shores.
There is recurrent talk of developing megaports
associated with bi-oceanic transport corridors.
Hoffmann (2000) shows how every one of the countries
on the South American Pacific seaboard has raised the
possibility of one or more of its ports being raised to
hub status. Mejillones in Chile, Callao in Peru, Manta
and/or Guayaquil in Ecuador and Buenaventura in
Colombia are among those most frequently mentioned.
In the same paper, Hoffmann uses a broad conceptual
approach to sum up recent port and international
shipping tendencies, and warns of the difficulties and
drawbacks of trying to create hubs in this part of the
continent.
In Central America too there has been a welter of
proposals for port and multimodal development. The
most striking is the Nicaraguan proposal for an inter-
oceanic canal; this would be a land bridge or dry canal
that would entail the construction of railway lines and
hub ports on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In Panama,
progress has been made with a scheme to turn the port
of Balboa into a regional hub. This port will
undoubtedly benefit from the modernization of the
railway linking it to the Manzanillo (Panama)
International Terminal, situated on the Atlantic coast.
In the south of Mexico, meanwhile, consideration
is being given to the possibility of developing the
Isthmus of Tehuantepec corridor by converting the ports
of Salina Cruz (Pacific) and Coatzacoalcos (Gulf of
Mexico) and modernizing the highway and railway link
between these two ports, which are situated on the
narrowest and flattest part of the country. The aim of
this project is to concentrate and redistribute large
volumes of international cargo. Researchers and
analysts also highlight the potential of the ports of
Altamira and Veracruz on the Gulf of Mexico, and of
Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas on the Pacific, to
become major cargo and redistribution hubs, although
the public sector has taken a cautious attitude to the
development of hub ports.
The idea that each country can have a hub port is
of a piece with approaches in the social sciences that
insist on circumscribing the unit of analysis to the
boundaries of the nation State (Yocelevzky, 1999), and
thus neutralize or dilute decision-making whose focus
is on global conditions or, to put it another way, the
“world system” (Braudel, 1985 and Wallerstein, 1996),
creating great expectations that have only weak
conceptual or empirical underpinnings.
This paper aims, then, to look at the issue of hub
ports in Mexico from a viewpoint that places the unit
of analysis on the global level, where the technology
and organization of liner shipping, the new role of ports
as logistical centres linking together increasingly
globalized production chains, and the development of
intermodalism are all coming to exercise a decisive
influence on the viability of hub ports.
The main purpose of this initial approach to the
subject is to establish elements of analysis or indicators
to ascertain the situation and opportunities of Mexican
ports operating liner sea container services within what
1 The concepts of centre, semi-periphery and periphery are current
in the field of economic geography and in the regional studies
debate (see Benko and Lipietz, 1994). It is also relevant to note the
increasingly multidisciplinary nature of the study of ports and
transportation. Previous approaches, which centred almost
exclusively upon economics or engineering, have been enriched
by contributions from social science disciplines and subdisciplines
such as transport geography and territorial and regional planning.
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we have termed the global network of ports. In other
words, the idea is to determine how high each of the
liner ports can rise within this hierarchical network.
To this end, section II summarizes recent port and
international maritime transport tendencies. Section III
proposes five elements of analysis for determining the
place and potential of the country’s ports in the global
system. The first is the volume and trend of
containerized cargo flows; the second is the nature of
the geographical space from which each port obtains
cargo; the third is the level of modal integration in each
port; the fourth is the location of each port in relation
to the main international maritime trade corridors, and
the fifth is the types of services with mainline and feeder
routes, and changes in the number of operators
integrated into the port. Lastly, section IV looks at future
prospects and offers preliminary conclusions for port
administrators, researchers and transport authorities,
and for economic agents concerned with port
development.
II
Recent port and international
shipping tendencies
Since the second half of the 1990s, a great many
research papers and articles have been written about
the drastic restructuring of the world’s ports and liner
container shipping services.2
Ports and international sea transport play a crucial
role in sustaining economic globalization and trade
liberalization. In fact, many of the new techniques for
integrating merchandise flows associated with
fragmented production chains scattered around the
planet were originally developed “out at sea” and
introduced into the international system by the world’s
large shipping firms. This is not surprising if we
consider that most international trade is conducted by
sea.
1. Technological trends: from the container
to giant ships and ports
The main technological and organizational changes
underlying the development of intermodalism and
“door-to-door” transport chains without cargo break-
up originated in the shipping industry. At the same time,
new actors appeared to create and coordinate the
nascent intermodal transport networks, in particular the
multimodal transport operator (MTO), whose role in
designing, selecting and overseeing the transport chain
is becoming ever more important.
From the technological point of view, the most
significant milestone since the advent of the container
has been the rapid increase in the size and carrying
capacity of ships. The speed of large ships has also been
progressively increasing.3 Since economies of scale and
the speed at which goods and transport equipment move
are very important in international shipping, it was to
be expected that the dynamism deriving from container
use would stimulate technological changes in ship
characteristics. The tendency towards giant ships has
not stopped. In the last decade, the largest container
ships doubled in size from 3,500 TEU4 to 7,000 TEU
capacity.
2 Most of them have come out of the United States and Europe
(Damas, 1995 and 1996; Kadar, 1996; Fossey, 1997 and De Monie,
1998, among others), although some studies have been produced
recently in Latin America (Burkhalter, 1999 and Hoffmann, 1998
and 2000).
3 Although experiments have been going on since the 1970s to
develop very fast ships (over 30 knots), these have not been
commercially viable owing to their limited carrying capacity. New
versions of these fast ships have still not solved the problem, so
they will only be used on very short routes. This is the case with
the Tecno Super Liner, developed in Japan and tested during 2000,
which can reach speeds of 45 knots but has a cargo capacity of just
1,400 metric tons (roughly 140 TEU). Having said this, container
ships, which are commercially viable on intercontinental routes,
have become considerably faster on average in the last two decades.
According to data from the German shipping company Hapag-
Lloyd, between 1984 and 1998 the speed of high-capacity container
ships rose from 18 to 25 knots.
4 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) is the unit equivalent to a 20-
foot-long container. It is the universally accepted unit for expressing
both the cargo capacity of ships and other forms of transport and
the container cargo volumes handled in intermodal ports and
terminals.
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Ships of this type are obviously used on the main
international trade corridors, which are in the northern
hemisphere, and for them to operate properly the
international port system has had to change profoundly.
The new dynamic of multimodal and sea transportation
has meant that only the largest ports have been able to
draw in large enough cargo volumes to make these ships
profitable to operate. Megaterminals have been built at
these ports, endowed with specialized high-
performance equipment and the installations needed for
large-scale movements. As far as is known, no container
ship of the post-Panamax type has yet been used on
north-south routes.
It is difficult to predict at present how large ships
might become. It is plain, though, that the tendency
towards giant ships will not halt any time soon, as is
clearly demonstrated by the new shipbuilding orders
being placed by the main shipping companies5 and by
the technological changes being made to intermodal
ports and terminals.
The technological feasibility of building larger,
faster ships is allowing shipping operators to restructure
routes and services to capture larger market segments.
Hoffmann (1998) has described another tendency that
has recently become firmly established in liner
shipping: the high degree of concentration that is
emerging in the sector.
2. Alliances and mergers: growing concentration
in international shipping
The process of concentration is characteristic of the
globalized capitalist economy, so it is no novelty in
itself. Given this, the tendency towards concentration
in liner shipping seems inevitable.
What is perhaps striking in this phase is the shape
and scale of concentration. The main shipping
companies are not only increasing their size and market
participation capacity by bringing in larger ships that
can be used to move more cargo at lower cost, but are
engaging in strategic alliances, takeovers or mergers
with competitors. The strategic alliances and mergers
being carried out by the so-called “megacarriers” (large
multimodal and shipping consortia) undoubtedly
amount to a firm new tendency that is giving rise to
significant changes in the organization of international
shipping and the position of ports.
The proliferation of alliances seems to be a
response by carriers to the demands of globalized
production and increasing deregulation of the maritime
sector. The fact is that most shipping companies
operating liner services now form part of one or more
alliances. In the 1990s, many regional-type alliances
arose to cover specific routes linking ports in one or
two continents, but the most spectacular development
has undoubtedly been the creation of the four great
global alliances formed by the world’s largest shipping
companies and multimodal transport operators.6
The key feature of global alliances is their
geographical reach. They are multi-continental and
cover all the main axes of international maritime
transport. In their founding agreements, they seek to
go beyond the initial premise which is at the basis of
any strategic shipping alliance, the sharing of space on
vessels. In a gradual process of integration, the global
alliances are seeking to share feeder services and make
joint use of terminals, both in ports and inland. They
are also seeking to conclude agreements under which
the land sections of distribution networks will be
operated jointly, i.e., they are trying to control the whole
network by consolidating intermodalism.
Among international shipping users, there is
concern about the consequences of the ever-increasing
tendency towards concentration of services, as now
reflected in the proliferation of alliances and mergers.
The creation of powerful actors with monopolistic or
oligopolistic power is unquestionably a concern for
exporters and importers. Analysis of trends in sea
container transportation rates for the main international
shipping lanes has shown, however, that over the last
seven years these rates have shown a tendency towards
negative growth on average, i.e., a tendency to decline;
consequently, it would seem that competition is still
strong and no actors have appeared with enough power
to have a significant effect on the market (Martner and
Moreno, 2001).
5 It is sufficient to mention as an example the order placed with
Samsung Heavy Industries in January 2001 by China Shipping
Container Line (CSCL) for two ships with a capacity of 10,000 TEU
apiece, which are due to go into operation in 2004. In recent years,
CSCL has become the second largest shipping company in the
People’s Republic of China; only COSCO is larger.
6 The four global alliances are: i) the Grand Alliance, formed by
P&O Nedlloyd, Hapag-Lloyd, Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK), Orient
Overseas Container Line (OOCL) and Malaysia International
Shipping Corporation (MISC); ii) the Unique Global Alliance,
formed by Maersk Line and Sea Land, recently merged into Maersk-
Sealand; iii) the New World Alliance, including American President
Line (APL-NOL), Mitsui-OSK Lines (MOL) and Hyundai Merchant
Marine, and iv) the United Alliance, involving Hanjin, DSR-Senator
and Cho Yang.
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It is still not clear how far shipping concentration
will go, nor how many companies will survive the
competition. Nonetheless, the tendencies alluded to are
having a substantial effect on the structure and
characteristics of ports around the world.
3. Towards a global port network
The appearance of large hub ports was made possible
by the increase in ship size and the creation of large
consortia and/or alliances among shipping operators.
To concentrate cargo in a main port node, however, it
is necessary to redefine the functions of a number of
intermediate ports while at the same time developing
an interconnected, hierarchical structure of smaller
ports to feed cargo to the hubs. Only then can megaships
and megaports be viable. When this is understood, the
idea of a global network of ports becomes conceptually
clear. The implication is that many ports will be
excluded from mainline services and, at best, will be
able to participate in the network only by servicing
feeder routes along which cargo is carried on smaller
ships to some main port node (hub port), there to be
transferred to large ships for onward carriage to the
final destination.
According to this conceptual approach, “global
hubs” are at the top of this global port network by virtue
of the size of their terminals and flows, the type of ships
operated and their geographical coverage, involving
multi-continental links. These global hubs are generally
situated in the northern hemisphere, on east-west routes,
which is where the main shipping lanes and networks
are.
Global hubs, defined as logistical centres for the
concentration, processing, consolidation and
distribution of goods and information, are fed by flows
from both land networks and maritime feeder networks.
The development of intermodalism has undoubtedly
been essential for the concentration of cargo in ports,
inasmuch as it extends inland connections and expands
the port hinterland to more distant regions.
In emerging and historically non-central places,
within the globalized capitalist economy whose trade
flows have recently grown strongly, the global port
network has required an intermediate link between the
great global hub and feeder ports. Consequently, a new
tendency in the formation of this global network has
been the creation of “regional hubs” whose size, cargo
capacity and geographical coverage are less than those
of the global hubs (table 1) but more than those of feeder
TABLE 1
World: Main global and regional hub ports, by geographical region, 1999
Global hubs Regional hubs
Asia Millions of TEU Asia Millions of TEU
Hong Kong (China) 16.1 Port Klang (Malaysia) 2.5
Singapore (Singapore) 15.9 Tanjung Priok (Indonesia) 2.3
Kaohsiung (Taiwan) 7.0 Manila (Philippines) 2.1
Busan (Rep. of Korea) 6.4 Laem Chabang (Thailand) 1.8
Shanghai (China) 4.2 Colombo (Sri Lanka) 1.7
Tokyo (Japan) 2.7 Yantian (China) 1.6
Europe Millions of TEU Europe Millions of TEU
Rotterdam (Netherlands) 6.4 Gioia Tauro (Italy) 2.3
Hamburg (Germany) 3.8 Algeciras (Spain) 2.0
Antwerp (Belgium) 3.6 Marsaxlokk (Malta) 1.0
Felixstowe (United Kingdom) 2.7 Piraeus (Greece) 1.0
La Spezia (Italy) 0.8
North America Millions of TEU The Caribbean Millions of TEU
Long Beach (United States) 4.4 Manzanillo (Panama) 1.0
Los Angeles (United States) 3.8 Kingston (Jamaica) 0.7
New York (United States) 2.9 Freeport (Bahamas) 0.5
Middle East Millions of TEU Middle East Millions of TEU
Dubai (United Arab Emirates) 2.8 Damietta (Egypt) 1.2
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Containerisation International.
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ports. Most regional hubs are on the intersection of east-
west and north-south routes.
In Latin America, one example of a regional hub
is the international terminal of Manzanillo, in Panama.
This port, which was inaugurated in 1995, receives
medium-sized container vessels (2,000 to 4,000 TEU)
from the trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic corridors and
links up container cargo flows using smaller ships (500
to 1,500 TEU) from the Caribbean Basin and South
America. Thus, the main activity of Manzanillo-Panama
is trans-shipment and maritime interconnection with
the regions of the American continent referred to.
All of a piece with the formation of the global port
network is the burgeoning of trans-shipment. The
segmentation of routes, and thence the proliferation of
feeder services among the different hierarchical levels of
the port network, is an indispensable precondition if cargo
is to be concentrated at hubs and larger and larger ships
are to be filled. Thus, trans-shipment becomes the “glue”,
the unifying element, in maritime transport chains. In other
words, the aim is to use trans-shipment to integrate into
the global port network a number of smaller hubs
(regional hubs) and feeder ports that, by allowing low-
volume mainline routes to be replaced by feeder routes,
can supply cargo and feed the great global hubs.
There are now ports that survive almost entirely
on trans-shipment. Many regional hubs, situated at key
geographical points where routes intersect, are of this
nature. A very thorough analysis is needed, however,
to ascertain the potential of each place, and how best it
can be fitted in to global goods transport and physical
distribution networks. The economic, geographical,
technological and logistical characteristics of the region
or country where it is intended that the hub should be
established also need to be considered in the light of
key tendencies in the organization of international
maritime and intermodal transportation.
The main concern of this paper is to establish the
viability of Mexican ports in the light of the new trends
in international maritime transport, and to ascertain their
potential to become hubs, whether as trans-shipment
ports or as intermodal links with inland regions.
III
Mexican ports in the global context
In Mexico, the port restructuring and privatization of
the 1990s produced substantial improvements in
infrastructure, equipment and goods loading and
unloading operations. New investment accompanied the
appearance of private port operators and the
rearrangement of liner services. Restructuring, in fact,
has been creating a new port geography, and in some
cases giving rise to forms of regional and global
integration that were unknown in previous periods.
The aim of this section is to establish five important
areas of analysis and suggest possible indicators that
can assist in determining the potential and limitations
of Mexican ports in a context dominated by the creation
of a global network of hub ports. The model proposed
includes not only typical port development indicators,
such as the rate of growth in cargo flows and shipping
services, but also some new ones related to the
geography of transport and the sea-land linkages of
ports. For this reason, stress is laid here on the role of a
port’s inland connection as a source of cargo, and as a
result the issue of modal integration takes on particular
importance. Analyses of the position of ports in relation
to the main international maritime trade corridors, and
of the combination of mainline and feeder services, are
also included. Both these aspects are of the greatest
importance in determining the global potential of the
country’s ports.
1. Evolution and dynamism of container cargo
in Mexican ports
During the 1980s, container handling on the Mexican
Pacific coast was still more or less evenly shared out
among at least four ports. In 1988, Pacific containers
were divided among Guaymas (21.6%), Manzanillo
(27%), Lázaro Cárdenas (28%) and Salina Cruz
(18.5%). These ports served their traditional captive
hinterlands: Guaymas covered the cities of the north-
west, Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas served the Bajío
area and the centre of the country, and Salina Cruz
served the south and south-east.
A similar situation was seen in the Gulf of Mexico,
albeit with differences of scale. Here too, most ports
had few links and only limited territorial integration
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with inland areas. The rough balance of flows seen on
the Pacific seaboard was not so much in evidence here,
however, owing to the existence of established ports
and cities that had traditionally been important in the
country, such as Veracruz and Tampico, whose
relationship with Europe and the American Atlantic
goes back to colonial times.
Despite the traditional dominance of Veracruz, in
the late 1980s container flows were still diversified,
being spread around at least five ports on the Gulf of
Mexico (table 2). In the north-east, Altamira and
Tampico had shares of 14% and 19.6%, respectively.
Tuxpan and Veracruz handled traffic with the central
and southern areas of the country, and their container
shares were 17.3% and 44.4%, respectively.
Coatzacoalcos, meanwhile, moved the containers of
companies in the south-east and the Yucatan peninsula.
This delicate near-balance of cargo flows, however,
could not long withstand the conditions and demands
of a highly competitive maritime and port environment,
where technological and organizational change, as
manifested chiefly in the advent of huge vessels, great
terminals and hub ports, and in the birth of global
alliances and megacarriers in the business of maritime
and multimodal transportation, resulted in a strong
tendency towards concentration and specialization.
During the 1990s, these global tendencies, along
with increasing trade liberalization and the port
restructuring carried out in Mexico, gave rise to a
substantial change both in the evolution of container
cargo flows and in the country’s port geography. The
first aspect that needs to be highlighted is the rapid
growth in general container cargo along both seaboards.
Between 1988 and 2000, container movements along
the Mexican Gulf and Caribbean seaboard grew at an
average annual rate of 16.4%. On the Pacific seaboard,
the average annual growth rate was 15.7% (table 2).
The second aspect is the reorganization of flows
and the new port hierarchy. In 2000, container flows
on the Mexican Gulf and Caribbean seaboard were
largely accounted for by just two ports, Veracruz and
Altamira (map 1). The former moved 64.4% of all
containers (measured in TEU) and the latter 21.8%.
Between them, they accounted for 86.2% of this type
of cargo on the Gulf seaboard. With the exception of
Puerto Progreso in Yucatan, the remaining ports on this
coast have stagnated and seen their importance as nodes
in regional development and production chains
diminish. In fact, Tuxpan and Coatzacoalcos have
dropped out of container movements, and their flows
have been absorbed by Veracruz. Tampico, meanwhile,
has lost share to Altamira.
On the Mexican Pacific coast, shifts in flows have
led to even more pronounced concentration in container
movements. In 2000, a single port attracted 89.3% of
all the seaboard’s containers (map 2). This was the port
of Manzanillo, situated on the coast of the state of
Colima. The other ports that had a significant share of
TABLE 2
Mexican ports: Container cargo, by coast, 1988-2000
(Percentage shares and average annual growth rates)
Pacific 1988 2000 AAGRa Gulf of Mexico 1988 2000 AAGR
% % % % % %
Ensenada 0 5.7 – Altamira 14.0 21.8 20.7
Guaymas 21.6 0 – Tampico 19.6 5.9 5.3
Mazatlán 2.5 3.6 19.4 Tuxpan 17.3 0 –
Manzanillo 27.0 89.3 27.8 Veracruz 44.4 64.4 20.0
L. Cárdenas 28.0 0.2 -24.7 Coatzacoalcos 4.1 0 –
Acapulco 2.2 0 – Puerto Progreso 0.4 7.1 48.8
Salina Cruz 18.5 1.2 -8.2 Others 0.2 0.8 –
Others 0.2 0 –
Total 100.0 100.0 15.7 Total 100.0 100.0 16.4
Movement in 1988 = 81,328 TEUb Movement in 1988 = 135,714 TEU
Movement in 1999 = 469,808 TEU Movement in 1999 = 838,523 TEU
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Coordinación General de Puertos y Marina Mercante.
a AAGR = Average annual growth rate (%).
b TEU: Twenty-foot equivalent unit.
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MAP 2
Mexican Pacific ports: Movement of container cargo, 2000
(TEU)
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from the Dirección General de Puertos y Marina Mercante.
MAP 1
Gulf of Mexico ports: Movement of container cargo, 2000
(TEU)
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of information from the Dirección General de Puertos y Marina Mercante.
540,014 (64.4%)
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this cargo category during the 1980s have suffered a
slump: liner vessels have stopped calling there and have
concentrated their operations in Manzanillo.
Thus, Guaymas stopped moving containers in the
1990s, Lázaro Cárdenas and Salina Cruz saw a sharp
drop, and only Mazatlán managed to increase its share,
although this is still only a small proportion of the total.
A newcomer to container movements is the port of
Ensenada, in Baja California; its share is modest,
although it may be able to grow at a good rate if it can
handle inputs on a large scale for maquila companies
in Tijuana, Mexicali and Ensenada itself.
The traditional indicator for measuring the
evolution of cargo has been the average annual growth
rate. This can be analysed and compared over set
periods of time chosen to encompass important socio-
economic events.7 Clearly, it will not by itself shed
enough light on the position of ports in the global
network. It will, however, provide clues of some
importance for subsequent analysis. To begin with, on
the Pacific seaboard there are two small ports (Ensenada
and Mazatlán) situated on the bottom rungs of the global
network (as feeders) and one port that is growing to
intermediate size and has the potential to occupy a
higher position in the international port hierarchy. This
is Manzanillo, whose average annual growth rate in
container movements was an impressive 27.8% in the
period 1988-2000, the highest in the country.
Similarly, on the Gulf-Caribbean seaboard there
are two dynamic hub ports that are tending towards an
intermediate size in the international system. These are
Veracruz and Altamira, which grew by an annual
average of over 20% between 1988 and 2000. Also
striking is the dynamism shown by a small port, Puerto
Progreso, in the flow of container cargo based on short-
range regional and international links. Since these data
do not explain how the country’s ports become cargo
hubs, however, or how they might take on greater
international importance, additional elements of
geoeconomic analysis need to be brought in.
2. Where ports obtain their cargo
Traditionally, ports obtained all their cargo from the
regions adjoining them. In other words, goods flows
were mainly attracted or generated by areas and urban
centres close to the port. The inefficiency of port
operations, regulatory barriers and the difficulty of land
access meant that a port’s hinterland was strictly limited
by geographical proximity. Thus, experts on port issues
(UNCTAD, 1992) used to say that Latin American ports
had a captive hinterland, since these constraints on
access and operations represented very costly barriers
for any port seeking to compete for a market situated
within another port’s well-defined hinterland.
But as intermodalism developed and legal,
administrative and operational obstacles were
overcome, the geographical area within which ports
could attract or generate cargo expanded considerably.
Similarly, captive zones of territorial influence broke
up and gave way to a shared hinterland that could be
fought over and shared by a number of ports
simultaneously, as and when the integration of the
different forms of transport made this possible. For
example, ports on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of the
United States have greatly expanded their hinterland
owing to the development of intermodal transport
systems. Now they are even competing for the
traditional hinterlands of Mexican and Canadian ports.
Thus, one of the main ways for a port to concentrate
cargo and become a regional or global hub is now to
expand its hinterland through multimodal integration.
Another way of concentrating cargo from distant
places is to develop maritime trans-shipment. As was
noted in previous sections, a growing number of ports
around the world have become trans-shipment hubs,
and some even survive almost exclusively on this
activity, which is so characteristic of the recently formed
global port network system. Important examples can
be found on virtually every continent: Singapore in
Asia, Algeciras and Gioia Tauro in Europe, Manzanillo-
Panama in America and Damietta in North Africa,
among others.
To ascertain the potential of Mexican ports and the
likelihood of their being able to participate and improve
their position in the global port network, it is necessary,
in each individual case, to analyse the geographical area
from which they obtain their cargo.8 Those whose
geographical area of influence continues to be their
traditional hinterland are unlikely to rise in the global
network. By contrast, those that extend their zone of
geographical influence and/or introduce trans-shipment
activities will be able to concentrate cargo and position
themselves more firmly in the network.
7 In this case, the major events marking out time periods are chiefly
trade liberalization and port restructuring.
8 A Paretian arrangement for analysing comparative developments
in the primary hinterland, accounting for 80% of the cargo handled
by the port by volume and/or value, and the secondary hinterland,
accounting for the remaining 20%, could be a useful and easily
applied numerical indicator for port administrators.
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The first thing that needs to be said is that most
national ports obtain their cargo from their traditional
hinterland, consisting of the state to which they belong
(or the province or department, in other countries) and
neighbouring states. Geographical proximity and
continuity continue to play a preponderant role, and
the opportunities for concentrating cargo are fewer.
A smaller number of ports obtain cargo from an
extended hinterland consisting of a number of states in
which physical proximity is not so important. The
structure is one of diversified multiregional linkage
which offers the potential for the port to concentrate
large volumes of cargo. Prominent in this group are
the ports of Manzanillo, on the Pacific coast, and
Veracruz and Altamira, on the Gulf of Mexico.
The concentration of specialist cargo agents,
multimodal transport operators and logistical services
for just-in-time management of manufactured inputs,
and the development of land transport corridors and,
in the best case, a land bridge with double-stack
container trains connected to inland intermodal
terminals, have all contributed in recent years to the
expansion and diversification of these three ports’
hinterland.
3. Modal integration of Mexican ports
The development of intermodalism is essential if cargo
is to be concentrated and the competitive position of
Mexican ports strengthened, particularly when most
cargo is generated or attracted by inland cities and
regions. However, the land-sea interconnection still has
problems with modal integration and with coordination
of the different activities associated with the physical
distribution of goods internationally.
Previous studies by the Mexican Institute of
Transport (IMT, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000) have
alluded to the problem created by the intrusiveness of
the goods inspection system, to the detriment of fluidity
in external trade chains. Better coordination and
cooperation among the institutions involved in this
would undoubtedly help reduce the amount of time for
which goods are tied up in port terminals, but there is
also a need for land transport options to be restructured,
both by streamlining operations and by introducing
logistical distribution strategies and modernizing
technology.
Application of the so-called national transport
evaluation indicators proposed by the Mexican Institute
of Transport (IMT, 2001b) would make it much easier
to carry out detailed analysis of the country’s land-sea
interconnection problems. Indicators such as the
waiting rate, the vehicle attention rate, container
turnaround time, the intermodal service utilization rate
and the supply capacity of the intermodal railway
service,9 among others, will furnish data that can be
used to refine the study of modal integration in each
port.
To begin with, a significant indicator for the land-
sea interconnection is the long average turnaround time
for containers in Mexican port terminals. This is
virtually double the international benchmark,10 and
unless a substantial reduction is achieved in the medium
term, it will limit the scope for concentrating larger
volumes of cargo and using ports to develop just-in-
time chains. Double-stack container train services are
another important element. Suffice to say that the two
major hub ports on the Gulf seaboard (Veracruz and
Altamira) handle large enough volumes of container
cargo to compete with United States Gulf ports by using
this technology, which doubles the number of
containers moved by one train and produces substantial
savings in total transport chain costs.
At present, the only Mexican port that has
consolidated the double-stack train service is
Manzanillo, and penetration has been growing. During
2000, some 40% of all containers moved went by
railway. Thus, this port has an extra competitive
advantage that in the long run will enable it to move up
through the global network.
A striking fact that emerges in this analysis is that
Mexican ports do not obtain maritime trans-shipment
cargo. Trans-shipment percentages are insignificant, if
not non-existent; ports, then, are only supplied by land.
The fact is that current legislation, far from encouraging
trans-shipment activity, constrains it. The Reglamento
de la Ley de Navegación (Mexico, Federal Government,
1998), or navigation act, states that foreign ocean-going
vessels may only carry empty containers among
9 The national transport evaluation indicators proposed by the
Mexican Institute of Transport (IMT, 2001b) assume simple
operations and data that administrators and transport regulators can
easily obtain. For example, the waiting rate is WR = Wt/Bt, where
Wt = waiting time to berth or enter the loading and unloading area
and Bt = time berthed at a quay or in inner terminal loading and
unloading areas. The vehicle attention rate is VAR = Aot/Bt, where
Aot = actual operating time and Bt = time berthed at a quay or in
inner terminal loading and unloading areas. The turnaround time
indicator is TI = time/containers.
10 In Mexico, the turnaround indicator averages 10 days, as against
an international benchmark of five days and a United States
benchmark of seven days.
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Mexican ports, for the purpose of using this equipment
for goods exports (article 71). This means that ocean-
going liner shipping companies cannot carry out trans-
shipment of full containers between the country’s ports.
In addition, article 72 of this law prohibits coasting
vessels from trans-shipping people or goods on to
ocean-going vessels. Opportunities for trans-shipment
are limited, therefore, to full or empty containers
coming from other countries, and empty containers in
the case of ocean-going liners calling in at more than
one Mexican port.
Thus, legal restrictions mean that this dynamic
option for obtaining cargo in the era of the global port
network cannot be fully exploited for cargo
concentration purposes. This is not the only factor
involved, however. Another important reason for the
absence of trans-shipment is undoubtedly the location
of Mexico’s coastlines in relation to the main
international shipping lanes.
4. The location of ports in relation to the main
ocean corridors
The analysis carried out in previous sections shows that
ports’ geographical location in relation to the main
shipping lanes largely determines the scope for creating
regional or global hubs within the network. For
example, Hoffmann (2000) clearly shows the
difficulties involved in establishing hub ports on the
South American Pacific seaboard, owing among other
reasons to its distance from the main international
shipping lanes.
Global hubs are invariably located on east-west
routes in the northern hemisphere. This is directly
related to the fact that the most important and heavily
used international trade corridors are there, namely the
connections among Europe, North-East Asia and North
America. Regional hubs, on the other hand, tend to
develop most easily in areas where the main east-west
corridors cross or connect with north-south routes. In
the American continent, the main areas where this is
the case are the Caribbean and Panama. Hoffmann
(2000) notes the impressive increase in trans-shipment
in some of this region’s ports, such as Manzanillo-
Panama, Kingston in Jamaica and Freeport in the
Bahamas. The reason for this is to be found in the
proliferation of feeder services on less heavily used
routes, and the concomitant need for trans-shipment in
places where routes cross. It is in the Caribbean that
the north-south routes of the American continent cross
the international shipping lanes linking North America,
Asia and Europe. On the continent’s Pacific coast there
is another point where routes cross: the ports of Long
Beach and Los Angeles in California, where smaller
ships from the South American Pacific meet larger
vessels on the North America-Asia axis.
It needs to be asked what the position of Mexican
ports is in this geographical context. Given their
geographical location, is it possible to create regional
or global hubs on Mexico’s coasts? On the face of it,
they do not seem to be very far away from where routes
cross or intersect. Principally, the Mexican Pacific is
situated on the axis of intersection constituted by Long
Beach/Los Angeles in California and the trans-shipment
ports of the Panama Canal. By contrast, on the axis of
intersection constituted by the Atlantic coast of Panama,
Mexico’s Gulf ports are relatively distant from the area
where north-south routes and east-west routes intersect,
by comparison with Florida and the island countries of
the Caribbean (map 3).
Thus, by concentrating ever-increasing flows of
container cargo generated or attracted by numerous
producer and consumer regions in the country, a
Mexican Pacific port such as Manzanillo, which is on
the axis of intersection referred to earlier and which
has substantially expanded its domestic hinterland,
could increase the number of containers moved
exponentially by carrying out connection and trans-
shipment functions between the north-south and east-
west routes. In other words, it would be in a position to
rise in the hierarchy of the global port network until it
became a regional hub obtaining cargo not just from
its extended hinterland, but also from maritime
interconnection and trans-shipment operations.
A study by Zohil and Prijon, cited by Hoffmann
(2000), analysed the relationship between the volume
of port traffic generated by a port’s hinterland, the
geographical location of the port concerned and the
volume of trans-shipment traffic for the Mediterranean
Sea. The authors “conclude that the volumes of trans-
shipment traffic of a port are a linear function of the
volume of port traffic [generated by the hinterland] and
an inverse linear function of the distance from the main
line [route] of transit. In other words, ships tend to prefer
ports for which they have local cargo and take advantage
of their presence there to engage in trans-shipment
operations. The shorter the detour from the main route
that the stopover involves, the more likely that port is
to be chosen as a trans-shipment centre…” (Hoffmann,
2000, p. 129).
The port of Manzanillo meets these criteria to a
great degree. It obtains cargo from its hinterland and is
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virtually on top of an intersection between mainline
and feeder routes. Thus the comparative advantages,
especially the geographical ones, are there. What is
needed now is for this potential to be realized by the
actions and vision of the public- and private-sector
actors associated with the port in question. A strategic
vision and the planning of development to anticipate
events are essential if this potential is to be taken
advantage of. In this case, planning objectives have to
be set so that the port can improve its position in the
face of strong competition from other ports in North
and Central America looking to act as hubs.
The main node of competition is undoubtedly
represented by the United States ports in the south of
California. Long Beach and Los Angeles continue to
overcome technical constraints to reclaim land from
the sea and develop container megaterminals.11 The two
ports will retain their role as a global hub for a long
time to come. In recent years, however, Manzanillo has
expanded its hinterland to take in Mexican cargo
markets in the north and centre of the country that were
being served by Long Beach and Los Angeles. It has
also managed to increase the number of trans-shipments
on the routes linking the South American Pacific with
Asia, although in this category the main competition is
provided by the ports of the Panama Canal.
The strength of the Gulf of Mexico ports as regards
their potential for rising within the global port network
lies principally in the opportunities for expanding their
hinterland. In this case, it would seem that only the
first criterion of Zohil and Prijon (cited in Hoffmann,
2000) is met, while the second one is not, since the
main east-west shipping lanes do not enter the Gulf
(map 3). In other words, their greater distance from the
axis where the main routes intersect makes it much less
likely that shippers will wish to carry out trans-shipment
activities in the Mexican Gulf ports. Thus, the potential
of Veracruz and Altamira basically lies in the scope for
expanding their hinterland and capturing larger
container flows from and to the country’s interior. Both
11 In 1997, the shipping company American President Line (APL)
inaugurated Global Gateway South, the largest container terminal
in the United States (265 acres), in the port of Los Angeles. Four
years later, in 2001, Maersk-Sealand began construction in the same
port of the largest container megaterminal in North America. At
484 acres, it is almost twice as large as the preceding one.
MAP 3
Mexican ports in relation to interoceanic shipping axes






129C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 2
HUB PORTS IN MEXICO:  L IMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES  •  CARLOS MARTNER PEYRELONGUE
these ports can aspire to become national cargo hubs if
they strengthen their intermodal connections.
5. Direct and indirect liner services12 in
Mexican ports
This is a new element, but it is essential in determining
the situation of ports in the global network. It is fairly
clear that a port catering to small ships and offering
indirect routes between places of origin and destination
will be near the bottom of the network hierarchy, as a
feeder port. The position is not so clear when feeder
routes coexist with mainline routes. It would be
necessary to analyse the characteristics of the latter in
particular. The outcome is very different depending on
whether the routes concerned are traditional mainline
ones directly linking ports a long way apart using
relatively small vessels with high costs per unit of cargo
moved, or whether these mainline routes are plied by
large or medium-sized vessels along the main
international shipping lanes.
In Mexico, most ports that move containers have
few liner services, arrivals are infrequent, and most
vessels are small ones working short routes that feed
larger ports abroad, whence the cargo is redistributed
by sea or land to the final destination. Within this group
of small ports, some are expanding and have been
introducing new services on more important routes,
such as Ensenada on the Pacific and Puerto Progreso
on the Gulf of Mexico. Others have remained fairly
stable as regards volumes and services offered,
examples being Mazatlán, Tampico and Puerto
Morelos. Lastly, there are ports that are clearly losing
ground and tending to be left outside the global network,
such as Lázaro Cárdenas and Salina Cruz on the Pacific
coast and Coatzacoalcos and Tuxpan on the Gulf coast.
The three ports that dominate the country’s
container movements are in a different situation. During
the 1990s, the ports of Manzanillo, Altamira and
Veracruz not only concentrated larger flows of container
cargo, but also attracted a large number of liner shipping
companies (table 3).
Without escaping from global trends, these actors
have formed strategic alliances to offer particular
services and serve routes jointly. The result is that larger
and larger vessels are docking in them, and with
increasing frequency. In addition, feeder services are
being combined with mainline routes on the great
international east-west shipping lanes.
To gain a more nuanced understanding of the
differences and particular potential of each of the three
ports concerned, a more detailed analysis of the
characteristics of these mainline services is required.
Firstly, it should be noted that the mainline services of
Veracruz and Altamira are part of the North America-
Europe shipping axis or corridor. The three services
that are most important in terms of frequency, ship size
and speed of turnover take in the two Gulf ports in the
same order. That is, they always call in first at Veracruz
and then at Altamira. This is obviously not down to
chance; the logic of this order is dictated by the direction
of flows and the characteristics of each port’s hinterland.
In Veracruz, imports going to the country’s largest
consumer region, namely the metropolitan area of
Mexico City and the states of the central zone, are what
predominate. Intermediate goods also come in for
companies working with lean inventories and the just-
in-time supply system, mainly in the automotive and
electronics industries. This is why Veracruz is the first
port of call on routes from Europe.
In Altamira, by contrast, it is export flows that
predominate. The port caters to areas that are primarily
producers of manufactured goods, such as the state of
Nuevo León and the Tampico-Altamira industrial
corridor itself, in the state of Tamaulipas. For this
reason, it is logical to expect Altamira to become the
port of departure for routes to Europe.
Two of the three direct routes go to ports in northern
Europe, of which the main ones include Antwerp,
Bremerhaven and Le Havre (table 4). Strategic alliances
among shipping companies have resulted in larger flows
on the northern Europe route, as a result of which they
have improved the service by introducing larger, faster
ships. The third route is towards Mediterranean ports
such as Valencia and Barcelona in Spain and La Spezia
and Gioia Tauro in Italy. This latter route operates at a
lower frequency, although plans were recently
announced to strengthen it by bringing in larger ships
with a greater frequency of arrival.
In addition, Veracruz has another direct service to
Europe that takes in Tampico instead of Altamira. This
is a lower frequency route, operated with small ships,
that includes some Caribbean ports in its itinerary. By
12 With mainline services, the cargo is not trans-shipped at any
stage during its sea crossing. Feeder services, by contrast,
necessarily entail trans-shipment of cargo at some intermediate port.
Between Mexico and Asia, for example, there are mainline services
in medium-sized container ships (2,000 to 4,000 TEU) and feeder
services in small ships (500 to 1,000 TEU) that trans-ship cargo in
the Pacific United States ports to larger vessels which then carry it
on to the Asian continent.
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TABLE 4
Gulf of Mexico ports: Mainline container routes
Shipping company or alliance Route Frequency Ships (in TEU)
Hapag-Lloyd/TMM/Lykes/ Veracruz - Altamira - Charleston - Antwerp - Thamesport - Weekly on 2,800
Evergreen/CMA-CGM Bremerhaven - Le Havre - Houston - Veracruz  set day  to
2,400
Mediterranean Shipping Co. Veracruz - Altamira - Houston - Nola - Miami - Freeport - Weekly on 2,700
Charleston - Antwerp - Hamburg - Bremerhaven - Felixstowe - set day
Le Havre
TMM/Lykes/Contships Veracruz - Altamira - Houston - New Orleans - Valencia - Every nine 2,400
Barcelona - Gioia Tauro - La Spezia - Miami - Veracruz  days  to
2,100
Melbridge C.L./H. Stinnes Veracruz - Tampico - La Guaira - Pto. Cabello - Río Haina - Once a 1,100
San Juan - Antwerp - Hamburg - Bilbao - San Juan -  Río fortnight
Haina - Veracruz
Source: Prepared by the author, 2001.
TABLE 3
Port of Manzanillo, Mexico: Presence of liner shipping companies, 1985-2000
Shipping company 1985 1990 1995 1997 2000












Australian New Zealand Line
Maruba Line
Pacific Star Line (COSCO)








Total shipping companies 6 8 12 15 21
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Coordinación General de Puertos y Marina Mercante and the Manzanillo Port
Administration.
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its structure and itinerary it seems to work more as a
traditional-style mainline route, with stops at certain
ports without specialist terminals where general loose
cargo handling is combined with container cargo
handling.
Feeder routes in Veracruz and Altamira are very
numerous. The most extensive ones link the east coast
of the United States with the east coast of South
America, with ships calling in at the Mexican Gulf coast
ports. This service is provided by strategic alliances
among Brazilian, European and North American
shipping companies operating vessels with a capacity
of roughly 1,500 TEU. Such services are regarded as
feeder ones here because they have onward connections
to Europe, Asia and Africa at the trans-shipment hubs
of the east coast of the United States and some hubs in
the Caribbean. There is also a set of short-distance
routes running between the Gulf of Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean Basin. Vessels with a
capacity of between 600 and 1,100 TEU operating
services of this type are constantly arriving in Veracruz
and Tampico.
On the Pacific coast, mainline and feeder liner
routes are much more concentrated on a single port.
Manzanillo is the main magnet for both types of route.
But that is not the only difference between it and the
Gulf ports. Mainline services there, connecting mainly
with the North America-Asia corridor, are more
numerous and operate with larger vessels (table 5).
In addition, two of the routes with direct services
form part of global alliances of international shippers.
Not only do they connect Manzanillo with the main
trans-Pacific axis (i.e., with the North America-Asia
corridor), but they also connect it with the main trans-
Atlantic axis, the North America-Europe corridor. Thus,
the United Alliance service (Hanjin Shipping, Cho Yang
and DRS-Senator) starts in Asia, calls in once a week at
Manzanillo and carries on through the Panama Canal
to the east coast of the United States and then Europe.
In late 2000 a route operated by what was then a
global alliance, but is now a merged company named
Maersk-Sealand, was introduced to Manzanillo. This
service also links Asia with the Pacific and Atlantic
coasts of North America, and it uses the largest
TABLE 5
Mexican Pacific ports: Mainline container routes
Shipping company or alliance Route Frequency Ships (in TEU)
Maersk-Sealand Hong Kong - Kaohsiung - Kobe - Nagoya - Yokohama - Weekly on 4,300
Oakland - Long Beach - Manzanillo (Mexico) - Balboa - set day
Manzanillo (Panama) - Miami - Charleston - Newark - Halifax
TMM/Lykes Lines/APL Manzanillo (Mexico) - Yokohama - Kobe - Hong Kong - Weekly on 3,266
Kaohsiung - Pusan - Kobe - Yokohama - Los Angeles - set day
Ensenada (Mexico) - Manzanillo (Mexico)
Hanjin/Cho Yang/DRS-Senator Yantian - Hong Kong - Kaohsiung - Pusan - Manzanillo Weekly on 2,700
(Mexico) - Manzanillo (Panama) - Savannah - Norfolk - set day
New York - Felixstowe - Bremerhaven - Rotterdam -
Le Havre - New York - Norfolk - Manzanillo (Panama) -
Manzanillo (Mexico) - Long Beach - Pusan - Yantian
CSVA/NYK Yokohama - Nagoya - Kobe - Pusan - Keelung - Hong Kong - Weekly on 2,226
Los Angeles - Manzanillo (Mexico) - Guayaquil - Callao - set day to
Iquique - San Antonio - Antofagasta - Callao - Manzanillo 1,726
(Mexico) - Yokohama
P&O Nedlloyd Singapore - Hong Kong - Keelung - Pusan - Kobe - Once a 2,169
Yokohama - Manzanillo (Mexico) - Buenaventura - fortnight
Callao - Iquique - Valparaíso
TMM/Lykes Lines/Maruba Kaohsiung - Hong Kong - Shanghai - Pusan - Los Angeles - Once a 1,730
Manzanillo (Mexico) - Puerto Quetzal - Puerto Caldera - fortnight to
Callao - Iquique - San Antonio 1,493
Source: Prepared by the author, 2001.
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container ships ever to dock in a Mexican port (4,300
TEU capacity).
In addition, three long-distance mainline routes
running from the South American Pacific to the Far
East and back have been introduced. The most frequent
one is that operated by the strategic alliance between
the Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores (CSVA), of
Chilean origin, and Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK), of
Japanese origin. This service operates with medium-
sized vessels (1,700 to 2,200 TEU) that dock in
Manzanillo once a week. The other two services running
from South America to Asia are less frequent. Ships
operated by P&O Nedlloyd, with a capacity of over
2,150 TEU, and by the strategic alliance formed by TMM,
Lykes Line and Maruba, with a maximum capacity of
1,730 TEU, dock in Manzanillo once a fortnight.
Feeder services have also grown. Short feeder
routes between the Central American Pacific and the
North American Pacific, and north-south routes between
South America and ports on the east coast of the United
States, have a greater presence in Manzanillo. Shipping
companies such as the Compañía Chilena de
Navegación Interoceánica (CCNI), TMM, Lykes Line,
Maruba and Pacific Star Line, among others, operate
these routes using small vessels of 1,000 TEU or less.
To sum up, the presence of high-capacity vessels
operated by two of the four global alliances of
international shippers, the link both with the trans-
Pacific corridor and with the trans-Atlantic one and the
development of new feeder services show that
Manzanillo is “astride” the axis where east-west and
north-south routes intercept and connect with one
another. Consequently, it could develop container cargo
concentration not only through growth in the flows from
its hinterland but also through greater participation in
international maritime trans-shipment.
IV
Prospects and preliminary conclusions
The concentration of container cargo at specific points
along the Mexican coast is a firm tendency that will
continue over the coming years. Economies of scale
can only be obtained and a market with a wide range
of specialist logistical services created if cargo is
accumulated at hub ports. Consequently, if port
terminals become saturated (as is the case with
Veracruz), it would be highly advisable for extra
capacity to be created in the reserve areas of the ports
themselves or somewhere nearby. If new ports are
created elsewhere, flows will be dispersed and the
advantages of agglomeration will be lost.
Most of the country’s ports will have feeder
functions within the global port network. Some feeders
are in a state of obvious decline, however (Lázaro
Cárdenas, Salina Cruz, Tampico, Coatzacoalcos,
Tuxpan), and these could be left out of the network if
they fail to find specific markets where they can be
competitive, or if they do not restructure their
integration strategies, services and land-sea
connections. Other feeders, such as Ensenada and
Puerto Progreso, are finding market niches and effective
operators to structure the requisite intermodal networks.
These have better prospects of consolidating their
position.
There are at least three ports that could move up in
the hierarchy of the global port network. With their
direct and feeder routes, larger vessels and frequent
services to major destinations, Altamira, Veracruz and
Manzanillo could reach an intermediate level as national
hubs concentrating container cargo and distributing it
along the Mexican Gulf and Pacific seaboards. In these
three cases, cargo would be generated from the
country’s different inland regions.
It would be highly desirable to strengthen the inland
connections of the main ports handling container cargo in
the country. As was pointed out in the analysis in previous
sections, almost all the cargo of ports with potential for
flow concentration comes from their respective
hinterlands, so the issue of modal integration should be
given high priority. As of 2001, railway transportation
played a negligible role in container cargo handling at
ports like Veracruz and Altamira. Despite the potential
advantage entailed by the presence of more than one
railway operator, double-stack services have not yet come
into operation, owing to the small cargo volumes attracted
by this form of transport. The railway cannot continue to
be left out of this process, as its cost advantages for high-
volume long-distance cargoes could greatly strengthen
the competitive position of Mexican Gulf ports.
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At present, the port with the greatest potential as a
future regional hub is Manzanillo. There are a number
of factors which support this assertion. Firstly, it is on
the axis where the routes of the east-west shipping
corridor intersect with north-south routes. Secondly,
owing to this, it is found to have more direct routes
linked to the trans-Pacific corridor and to the trans-
Atlantic corridor as well. Thirdly, the largest container
ships ever seen along the Mexican coast have begun to
call in there. The combination of these three factors
gives Manzanillo the opportunity to develop
progressively as a regional trans-shipment centre for
Central and South American feeder routes and liners
requiring a wider range of connections with Asia and
Europe.
The rise of Manzanillo to the status of regional
hub is not guaranteed and will depend both on the
international competition environment and on the
policies and actions of the public, private and social
sectors as they relate to the development of the port. To
realize the port’s potential, it will be vital to pursue a
strategic approach whereby long-term planning is
carried out to respond properly to the demands this port
hierarchy entails. Not only do reserve areas for new
container terminals need to be identified in advance,
but there needs to be planning of connections with land
transport systems, cargo access and departure
infrastructure, reserve areas for the development of
intermodal terminals and logistical platforms for cargo
consolidation and distribution, and shipping districts
in general. In short, turning the port into a hub will
involve a strategic conception with elements of long-
term planning that looks beyond the precincts of the
port and increasingly involves the outer harbour and
its actors, the port city and its connections with the
hinterland.
Lastly, to encourage trans-shipment of full and
empty containers among Mexican ports and ensure that
this activity, which is of greater and greater importance
in intermodal transport networks, is integrated into the
coasting trade, it is recommended that articles 71 and
72 of the Reglamento de la Ley de Navegación (Mexico,
Federal Government, 1998) be reformed, as the
conditions they place on links between coasting and
ocean-going container traffic have only served to hinder
port and shipping activity in the country. If these
regulatory constraints were done away with, the benefits
would far outweigh the disadvantages. Mexican ports
could concentrate and move larger volumes of cargo if
these “shackles” were removed. Similarly, the coasting
trade would secure a new and hitherto unexploited
market niche along the country’s seaboards: the carriage
of containers among Mexican ports, with the potential
for linking up with international shipping routes by
carrying out trans-shipment in one of the country’s
ports.
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